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Abstract Reputations of organizations and its individual members are valuable
resources that help new organizations to get access to investment capital. Reputa-
tions, however, can have different dimensions. In this paper, we argue that an
individual’s reputation along a particular dimension will have a positive effect on
the behavior of investors when it is role congruent. In addition, we argue that also
scoring favorably on the role-incongruent dimension at the same time—or, in other
words, engaging in reputational category spanning—will weaken the positive effect
of the role-congruent reputation. Our empirical setting is the film industry where we
study the effect of the two main dimensions of reputation in cultural industries,
artistic and commercial, of both directors and producers on the size of the invest-
ment by distributors. In this study, artistic reputation is based on professional critics’
reviews and commercial reputation on box office performance of the films in which
individuals were involved in the past. We find that the commercial reputation of a
film producer based on past box office performance has a positive effect on the size
of the investment by film distributors. In addition, we find that directors who at the
same time combine both a favorable commercial as well as an artistic reputation
actually receive a lower investment from film distributors.
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1 Introduction
Corporate reputations can derive from many different sources. Besides past
performance in terms of perceived quality by consumers (Shapiro 1983; Podolny
1993), there are many other sources of reputation in the literature that include
certification by third parties (Rao 1994), ratings (Durand et al. 2007), reviews
(Basuroy et al. 2003; Eliashberg and Shugan 1997), awards (Anand and Watson
2004; Gemser et al. 2008) and even the mere volume of media attention (Pollock
and Rindova 2003; Rindova et al. 2007). While many studies about corporate
reputation focus on its effects on eventual market performance of firms (e.g.,
Fombrun and Shanley 1990; Roberts and Dowling 2002; Rindova et al. 2005), a
related research stream focuses on the effects of corporate reputation on the
behavior of resource providers, especially that of investors (Stuart et al. 1999; Certo
2003; Higgins and Gulati 2006).
However, a new organization in the process of being founded, and in search for
investment capital, will suffer from a liability of newness (Freeman et al. 1983)
since it does not have a corporate reputation based on its own past performance.
Earlier studies, however, show that the reputations of important core members that
are affiliated to an organization, such as CEOs (D’Aveni 1990; Higgins and Gulati
2003, 2006; Cohen and Dean 2005) or other board members (Certo 2003; Musteen
et al. 2010), can also have an impact on the reputation of the firm as a whole. In
addition, the composition (Deutsch and Ross 2003) of the board and the background
(Beckman et al. 2007; Beckman and Burton 2008) of the top management team or
individual entrepreneur (Hsu 2007) of a new firm has a significant effect on the
behavior of investors.
Similar to corporate reputations, reputations of top management team members
in new ventures in search of investment capital can derive from many sources. An
important source is the performance of the organizations in which these individuals
were involved in the past (Hsu 2007). In addition, since a reputation can have
multiple facets or dimensions (Fombrun and Shanley 1990; Fombrun and Van Riel
1997; Jensen and Roy 2008), one might expect investors to differ with respect to the
value they attach to the scores of these top management team members along these
different dimensions of reputation. Investors may also be expected to pay attention
to the ways in which the scores along different dimensions of the reputation are
distributed among these founding members. In other words, building on Porac et al.
(1995), one might expect investors to attach greater weight to dimensions of
reputations that are particularly informative in relation to the role of the particular
founder members, and which can, therefore, better serve as predictors of desired
outcomes of an organization founded by members occupying these particular roles.
Linking particular dimensions of reputation to the roles of the individuals to whom
these reputations belong is important, since roles itself are also a means of getting
access to resources (Baker and Faulkner 1991), such as investment capital.
Assuming that corporate reputations are constructed out of individual reputations
that can be scored along different dimensions, it also becomes necessary to think
about possible interactions. If one individual scores well along different dimensions
of reputation; will this increase the reputational resources this individual brings to
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the organization? Or are there dimensions of reputation that are considered less
compatible in particular contexts and, therefore, interact negatively? This study of
the film industry will explicitly test this last possibility because it focuses on two
dimensions of reputation—artistic and commercial—that precisely in cultural
industries, such as the film industry, are seen to be not well compatible (Caves 2000)
and are linked to competing logics (Glynn and Lounsbury 2005; Eikhof and
Haunschild 2007).
Earlier studies (e.g., Delmestri et al. 2005; Holbrook and Addis 2008; Ferriani et al.
2009) already used these two dimensions in their analyses of the film industry. A recent
study by Hadida (2010) showed that past commercial success—in terms of box
office—has a positive effect on both the future budget and commercial performance of
a film, while past artistic success of a film project team’s members—in terms of
awards—is a good predictor of artistic performance. This paper will build on these
earlier results and specifically focus on the effect of the individual reputations in
relation to the specific roles of these individuals on the behavior of a particular group
of investors, namely distributors offering minimum guarantees. Precisely by focusing
on one group of investors who have similar motivations and have to make their
decisions at a very early stage, long before any outcomes of the venture can be
evaluated; we can test theoretical arguments about the impact of reputations based on
past performance of the individuals involved in the new organization.
The first contribution of this paper is that we distinguish between different
dimensions of reputations of new ventures’ founding members and study to what
extent investor behavior is influenced by these dimensions of reputations being role
congruent. We, therefore, study whether there is a positive relation between
reputational scores along particular dimensions of particular founding members that
occupy particular roles in the new venture, and the size of investments. Second, we
will focus on the possible negative interaction effects between having a positive
non-role-congruent reputation at the same time as a positive role-congruent
reputation. Unfocused identities or category spanning may lead to more attention,
but it is also risky since it could lead to lower appeal or negative evaluation
(Zuckerman 1999; Zuckerman and Kim 2003; Zuckerman et al. 2003; Hsu 2006;
Hsu et al. 2009). Unfocused reputations may be especially harmful if the different
dimensions are incompatible. Again, this is especially relevant in the cultural
industries where there is a possible tension between having both a favorable artistic
as well as commercial reputation (Caves 2000).
Whereas previous studies focus on the risks of ex ante strategies of spanning
categories such as a producer’s choice between making a multiple-genre as opposed
to a single-genre film (Hsu 2006), or stretching identities by film actors and
actresses trying to break away from being typecast for specific roles (Zuckerman
et al. 2003), our study focuses on the effect of being positively evaluated ex post by
different categories of evaluators along different dimensions of performance and
how this subsequently affects investor behavior. In other words, we focus on the
detrimental effects of having an unfocused reputation as a specific form of having an
unfocused identity.
Although one would expect that past performance in more than one dimension at
the same time would constitute a positive signal that reduces investment risk, this
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may also create uncertainty for investors with respect to the intentions of a founding
member of a new ventures as to which goals he or she will pursue. In Hollywood,
this is illustrated by director Michael Cimino who, after directing the both
commercially and artistically highly successful film ‘the Deer Hunter’, nearly
ruined the film studio United Artists with his huge flop ‘Heaven’s Gate’ (Bach
1999). In addition and possibly more important, it may also create uncertainty to
investors as to which category of evaluators he or she will (try to) appeal to.
Reputations, and the issue of unfocused reputations, are especially relevant in the
context of the cultural industries that are characterized by a high degree of
uncertainty. In order to reduce risk, investors can regard the reputations of the
founding members derived from their past performance as insurance. However,
organizations in cultural industries also need to balance the tension between art and
commerce (Caves 2000). A film can be a commercial success in terms of the
number of tickets sold at the box office, but at the same time, it can be an artistic
success in terms of favorable critics’ reviews (Gemser et al. 2007; Basuroy et al.
2003; Eliashberg and Shugan 1997). In this paper, we posit that investors face an
investment risk when financing new ventures of which the core members have both
a favorable commercial as well as a favorable artistic reputation at the same time.
The empirical setting of this paper is the film industry. The film industry is a
highly uncertain and risky industry due to the high sunk costs and difficulty of
predicting market demand. This is reflected in the ‘no one knows anything’
principle (Goldman 1984). Moreover, since in the film industry the strategic
resources of an organization are almost all human resources, it seems reasonable to
focus even more on the reputations of the key individuals involved. We limit
ourselves to two dimensions of reputation: commercial and artistic, which are the
basic dimensions along which performance is measured in cultural industries (Caves
2000). We also focus on two roles: the producer and the director, each of whom is
specifically associated with one of these dimensions. The director is assumed to
have the main responsibility for artistic quality, the producer for the commercial
performance. The investors whose behavior we will study are the film distributors
who have to decide on the size of the so-called minimum guarantee that they want to
invest in a project when it is still in its pre-production stage.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In the theory section, we review the
literature on reputation and investment, and category spanning, on the basis of
which a number of hypotheses will be proposed. This will be followed by a
description of the research setting—the Dutch film industry—the data and the
results. Discussion and conclusions will round off the paper.
2 Theory and hypotheses
2.1 Reputations and investment in new ventures
When the quality of a producers’ products are difficult to observe before an
investment or purchase decision is made, actors can use the quality of past products
as an indication of the quality of current or new products (Shapiro 1983).
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Reputation, in other words, refers to beliefs about the focal actor’s perceived
qualities based on past performance. Reputation has economic importance because
it helps decision-makers to make decisions in the absence of more complete
information (Shapiro 1983; Fombrun and Shanley 1990; Podolny 1993). While
products and individuals can have reputations, organizations can have corporate
reputations (Fombrun 1996), which have an effect on the behavior of the
organizational stakeholders, ranging from consumers to resource providers, such
as investors. The effects of reputation on acquiring resources are seen most clearly
in the case of new venture firms or entrepreneurs in search of financial resources.
New organizations, and especially organizations that are still in the process of
being founded, suffer from a liability of newness (Freeman et al. 1983). While
incumbents find their ability to obtain financial resources to be dependent on their
reputation, new ventures are restricted in their access to financial resources due to a
lack of reputation, (Milgrom and Roberts 1986; Fombrun and Shanley 1990; Stuart
et al. 1999; Higgins and Gulati 2006; Kang 2008). However, new organizations do
have members, and the composition of early membership can contribute to the
organization’s corporate reputation. Musteen et al. (2010) show how the average
tenure of outside directors has an impact on the corporate reputation of the firm.
Pfeffer (1972) and Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) stress the extent to which the
characteristics of individual directors can determine the firm’s ability to attract
resources from external stakeholders. Busenitz et al. (2005) argue that the new
venture founding team’s investment in their own venture functions as a signal to
outside investors.
A crucial source of information for capital providers is the performance of the
organizations in which these founding members of a new venture were involved in
the past (Hsu 2007). Investors, in other words, will take the performance-based
reputation of the core members of the new organization into account in their
decision to provide startup capital. If founders of new organizations already set up
other organizations in the past—so-called serial or habitual entrepreneurs (West-
head and Wright 1998)—potential investors will evaluate the new firm also on the
basis of the prior performance of these earlier ventures. Likewise, prospective
investors in project-based organizations (PBOs), organizations that dissolve once
the project for which it was specifically set is finished (Jones 1996; DeFillippi and
Arthur 1998), will evaluate the performance of the earlier PBOs in which the core
members of the new PBO have been actively involved. In industries that are
characterized by PBOs careers typically consist of a series of successive
memberships in different PBOs.
2.2 Reputations, dimensions, and roles
A corporate reputation, however, can be scored along many dimensions. Organi-
zations have reputations ‘…for something’ (Fisher and Reuber 2007: p. 57), for
instance, for being well-managed, providing high product-quality, or excellence in
customer service. Organizations can intentionally focus on building their scores
along certain dimensions of reputation (Voss et al. 2000), for instance, to fit in
administrative categories that make them eligible for receiving public or private
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grants and contracts, and, therefore, increase their chances of survival (DiMaggio
and Powell 1983). Scoring high along a particular dimension of reputation functions
as a form of categorization and can be expected to play a similar role in the
decision-making processes of observers. With respect to firms, a tendency of
focusing on a particular dimension of reputation will serve a similar purpose as
using categories in a particular classification system, namely simplifying complex
environments by focusing ‘on attributes that are particularly informative and
predictive of organizational activities’ (Porac et al. 1995: p. 207), on the basis of
which competitors are compared.
Because of their expected predictive value, investors in new ventures use
reputational signals based on past performance of its individual founders as
insurance for their current investments. Similar to corporate reputations, however,
reputations of top management team members in new ventures in search of
investment capital can derive from many sources. Earlier studies found a number of
relations between the behavior of investors and the characteristics and personal
background of an organization’s board (Deutsch and Ross 2003), differentiating
between the CEO (D’Aveni 1990; Higgins and Gulati 2003, 2006; Cohen and Dean
2005) and other board members (Certo 2003; Musteen et al. 2010), the management
team (Beckman et al. 2007; Beckman and Burton 2008) and the individual
entrepreneur (Hsu 2007).
Although the individual reputations of board members or the entrepreneur turned
out to be strong predictors of investor behavior, none of these studies looked at the
value of particular dimensions of reputations in relation to individuals occupying
particular roles and the concomitant responsibilities in the new organization.
However, in their study of the film industry Baker and Faulkner (1991) found that
individuals occupying particular roles are better able to attract resources such as
investment capital (1991). They also show that if particular distributions of roles
among the founding members of the organization were correlated with past success,
new organizations with that particular distribution of roles were also more likely to
attract investment capital. Yet Baker and Faulkner did not study the link between
different dimensions of reputations in relation to individuals occupying particular
roles and their concomitant responsibilities in these organizations. However, one
might expect that it makes a difference to investors which dimensions of reputations
are linked to which of the new venture’s top management team members and the
role that they will perform. Especially with respect to new ventures and building on
Porac et al., one might expect that investors categorize individual founding
members of new ventures along the dimension of their reputation that is particularly
informative, and which can serve as predictors of certain outcomes (Porac et al.
1995).
Where previous studies focus on either particular (combinations of) roles or
(dimensions of) reputations as means of getting access to resources such as
investment capital, we argue that it is important to link particular dimensions of
reputation to the role of the individual to whom the reputation belongs. One might
expect that there are different dimensions along which investors in a new venture
score the performance of organizations and individuals, and that particular roles in
the organization are strongly associated with particular dimensions of reputation. In
232 J Cult Econ (2012) 36:227–248
123
a high-tech start-up, for example, the reputation for technological excellence will be
linked more strongly to the individual reputation of the Chief Technical Officer,
while the reputation for financial performance will be more strongly linked to the
track record of the Chief Financial Officer. Alternatively, in the film industry, the
most relevant dimensions of reputation are the artistic and the commercial ones that
are predominantly linked to, respectively, the director and producer. Since corporate
reputation along a particular dimension is expected to be closely linked to the
individual reputation of the member of the organization whose role is most closely
associated with that dimension, the arguments above suggest that the reputation
scores of these individuals along these dimensions will have a strong impact on the
behavior of investors toward the venture as a whole.
Hypothesis 1 There is a positive relation between the strength of role-congruent
reputation of a founding member of a new organization and the size of investment in
that organization.
2.3 The effects of having more than one good reputation
If an investor primarily determines the size of the investment based on the
reputations of the involved individuals along the dimension that is role congruent
(for the individual in a particular role), it would be interesting to study the effect of
that individual also scoring favorably along another dimension of reputation that is
not role congruent. Will favorable reputations always have a positive effect, even if
they are not along dimensions that are linked to that specific role? Or does it detract
from the extent to which the individual reputation contributes to the corporate
reputation’s effect on behavior if the individual occupying that role also scores well
along other dimensions at the same time?
There are two main arguments why there might be a negative interaction between
the scores along the two dimensions. The first is that—in the particular environment
in which the reputations are observed—the two dimensions are not considered to go
well together or might even be considered incompatible, because the dimensions
seem linked to different logics (Glynn and Lounsbury 2005). This would have the
effect that individuals that score well along both dimensions of reputation will look
less trustworthy to outside observers. The latter will, therefore, be less likely to base
their decisions on this information. If one hears about an athlete who is great in
weightlifting and in gymnastics, this sounds less trustworthy—because most people
would assume that a body suitable to the one sport would be quite unsuitable for the
other—than just hearing that she is a successful weightlifter.
It has often been noticed that in the cultural industries, there can be a strong
tension between artistic and commercial objectives and performances (Caves 2000;
Holbrook and Addis 2008) and the artistic and commercial logics to which they are
linked (Glynn and Lounsbury 2005; Eikhof and Haunschild 2007). Although it is
certainly not impossible—and there are notorious examples from each cultural
industry—that a great artist also has a sound sense of business, this is not the
expected state of affairs. Because of this, outside observers will be more hesitant to
make decisions on the basis of a particular individual reputation if the individual
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also scores high along another dimension, while in the particular environment of the
cultural industries performing along these two dimensions is considered to be likely
to cause friction.
There could be a second argument why having a non-role-congruent reputation
could affect the decisions of outside observers. A recent stream of literature studies
the effects of belonging to more than one category—so-called category spanning
(Zuckerman and Kim 2003; Zuckerman et al. 2003; Hsu and Hannan 2005; Hsu
2006; Hsu et al. 2009; Ruef and Patterson 2009). The main conclusion drawn from
this literature is that, apart from producer-side effects of specialization (Hsu et al.
2009), having a clear identity increases visibility, makes it easer to get attention, and
is helpful in gaining market entry. On the other hand, category spanning or complex
identities will cause ambiguities, unclear expectations, and decreased legitimacy in
the eyes of audiences, in turn resulting in lower evaluations and lower performance.
A number of these studies were conducted in the empirical setting of the film
industry with respect to the benefits and risks of actors and actresses being typecast
(Zuckerman et al. 2003) and of producers making either single-genre or multi-genre
films (Hsu 2006). Although the literature on category spanning and market identity
focuses on product categories, and categories of organizational forms, we suggest
that the underlying ideas may be just as well applicable to dimensions of reputation.
Since earlier research demonstrates the risk of unfocused identities or category
spanning because it could lead to lower appeal or more negative evaluation
(Zuckerman 1999; Zuckerman and Kim 2003; Zuckerman et al. 2003; Hsu 2006;
Hsu et al. 2009), scoring favorably along multiple dimensions of reputation at the
same time may also be risky. Thus, founding members of a new venture spanning
reputational categories might be evaluated less positively, which will have a
negative effect on the willingness of investors to provide start-up capital for the
venture. Moreover, the negative effect due to the perceived lack of focus because of
more than one strong reputation may be strengthened when there is a possible
tension between different dimensions of reputation, such as the artistic and
commercial dimensions (Caves 2000; Eikhof and Haunschild 2007). A professional
with both a favorable artistic as well as a commercial reputation will have a less
focused reputational identity than one who only scores well along the role-
congruent dimension. Both arguments discussed here suggest a negative interaction
effect. We, therefore, propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 The positive relation between the strength of role-congruent
reputation and investment in a new organization will be reduced by the strength of
the non-congruent reputation of a founding member of that organization.
3 Methods
3.1 Research setting and data collection
The empirical setting of this study is the Dutch film industry. The film industry in
general (Jones 1996; DeFillippi and Arthur 1998), and the Dutch film industry
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specific (Ebbers and Wijnberg 2009), is characterized by project-based organiza-
tions (PBO). We analyze the decisions of one group of investors: film distributors.
Besides buying the distribution rights once the film is finished, distributors can also
invest in a film project by providing a so-called minimum guarantee upfront. Film
distributors are primarily interested in the commercial potential of the films in
which they invest and, therefore, attempt to guess the taste of the consumers that
will buy tickets at the box office (Eliashberg et al. 2008). Film distributors have the
first share of the film rental revenues from box office sales until they recoup their
investment—also called minimum guarantee—and the costs that they made in
producing film prints for the film theaters and advertising costs (Blume 2004). The
focus in our study is on two key roles in a film project: film producers and film
directors, since these are the two founding members of a new film venture.
The two main dimensions of reputation in our study are derived from past artistic
and commercial performance (Caves 2000). These two performance measures have
also been distinguished in earlier studies of the film industry (Basuroy et al. 2003;
Delmestri et al. 2005; Holbrook and Addis 2008; Ferriani et al. 2009) in which
commercial performance is measured in terms of ticket sales at the box office
(Sorenson and Waguespack 2006), while artistic performance is based on
professional critics’ reviews (Eliashberg and Shugan 1997). The director is
predominantly responsible for the artistic aspects of the film. The artistic reputation
of a director can attract other high quality professionals with artistic roles such as
cinematographers and actors (Delmestri et al. 2005) and be a predictor of a new
film’s artistic success. The producer’s reputation is related to his track record of
successfully coordinating and assembling resources and—together with the
distributor—delivering commercially success films (Sorenson and Waguespack
2006).
The investment data we use in this study are collected from the archives of the
Dutch Film Fund (DFF). The DFF provides production subsidies to Dutch films and
keeps a record with financial data of most Dutch films. This database includes,
among other things, the names of the director and producer and the size of the
investment or minimum guarantee provided by which distributor. For this study, we
used data of 246 films Dutch films released in Dutch film theaters between 1992 and
2008. Dutch films are operationalized as films of which the producer and the
director either have the Dutch nationality or attended the Dutch Film Academy. The
Dutch Film Academy is the most prominent film school in the Netherlands. The
films released between 1992 and 1998 were used for constructing the reputation
variables in terms of past commercial and artistic performance of the directors and
producers that are involved in the new film venture. We used these two dimensions
of reputation to explain investment decisions for all the film that where released in
film theaters between 1998 and 2008.
3.2 Dependent variable
The dependent variable distributor investment is the absolute size of the investment
of a film distributor in Euros (n = 141) in a particular film project. The investment
of distributors is driven by their evaluation of a film project’s commercial potential
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or expected future earnings in the market. Distributors invest in film productions by
providing so-called minimum guarantees (MG) in exchange for the distribution
rights. The MG is an upfront compensation for expected future earnings that
producers can invest in the production of a film in exchange for the distribution
rights. Distributors are the first to recoup their minimum guarantee from the
commercial exploitation of the film, before the DFF earns back the subsidies that
they provided and before they start paying royalties to the producer and key creative
personnel.
3.3 Independent variables
In order to measure the effect of reputations on the size of the investments, we
operationalized reputation as the average performance of the last three films of the
producer and director before the investment decision was made with respect to the
focal film. The film data that we collected are categorized by their release year. On
average, there is a 2-year time lag between the capital investment decision and the
eventual release in the theaters. Therefore, we used the last three films prior to the
release date of the focal film minus 2 years to construct the reputation variables.
Producers and directors who aspire to make their very first film do not have a proven
track record that is visible in our data. However, this does not necessarily mean that
they are novices with no relevant reputation. Directors and producers who make
their first film may have gained experience in neighboring industries such as
television, commercials, or theater before they make the switch to film (Storper
1989). We, therefore, coded new entrants in the film industry as having an average
reputation. At the same time, we added control dummy variables for producers and
directors who make their debut (see below).
3.3.1 Commercial reputation
Box office success is an often used construct for measuring commercial
performance of films (see, e.g., Sorenson and Waguespack 2006; Delmestri et al.
2005). We used the cumulative box office revenues over all consecutive years of a
film’s first run in the theaters. The commercial reputation of producers and directors
is derived from box office ticket sales in film theaters and measured as the average
cumulative box office performance of the last 3 films prior to the expected
investment decision—2 years before the eventual release year. Box office data of
films released in the period 1992–2008 was obtained through the Dutch Association
of Film Distributors.1
3.3.2 Artistic reputation
The artistic reputation of producers and directors is derived from the average film
critics’ reviews of the last 3 films prior to the investment decision of the focal film.
Critics’ reviews are measured in the number of stars on a scale from 0 to 5. The
1 Nederlandse Vereniging van Filmdistributeurs (NVF).
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more stars, the more positive the critic’s review. We used the average number of
stars in the ratings of film reviews in the four largest Dutch national newspapers—
Algemeen Dagblad, Volkskrant, NRC Handelsblad, and Telegraaf—to rate the
artistic performance of individual films, and in turn, artistic reputations of producers
and directors. The review data in these newspapers are collected by and published in
the Filmkrant, a magazine dedicated to film.
3.4 Control variables
We included a number of control variables that are likely to affect our model. First,
the control variable budget is included since large budget films have a higher
production value. A big budget allows producers to include, for example, more
actors, special effects, stunts, exotic locations, and extras, which in turn, make it
relatively easier for the distributor to market and sell the film. The budget variable
includes government subsidies and investments from public television broadcasters.
Film distributors, however, have the first share of the film rental revenues from box
office sales until they recoup their investment (MG) and the costs that they made in
producing film prints and advertising costs (Blume 2004).
Second, we constructed two debut dummy variables to control for the effects of
new entry of producers and directors without prior experience in the film industry
and as such suffer from a liability of newness (Freeman et al. 1983).
Third, we included a control for original script. Film scripts that are based on
books or theater plays that have proven their commercial value are expected to
increase the chance of success of the subsequent film (Ferriani et al. 2009).
Fourth, we included controls for prior collaboration director and prior
collaboration producer since new venture investors in general (Shane and Cable
2002), and film distributors more specific, tend to favor and allocate more resources
to new ventures of prior collaboration partners (Sorenson and Waguespack 2006).
Finally, we included three genres dummies for comedy, action, and family films.
Especially comedies are known to be difficult to export, and therefore, one might
expect that distributors have a preference for investing in locally produced comedies
(Friedman 2004). The comedy dummy includes (romantic) comedies and romantic
films. The action dummy includes thriller, horror, crime, and adventure. The family
dummy includes children’s films. The baseline group is drama and includes historic
dramas.
3.5 Analytical approach
We performed a robust hierarchical regression analysis for estimating the standard
errors using Huber-White sandwich estimators that reduces the influence of outliers
or extreme values in the data (White 1980). As a rule of thumb, 20 percent of the
films earn 80 percent of the revenues (DeVany and Walls 1996). This could also
mean that individual commercial reputations that are derived from the commercial
success of an individual’s last three films might turn out to be skewed. We
performed a hierarchical analysis that allows us to compare increasingly complex
models. This is especially relevant when one wants to compare models with main
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effects, with subsequent models that include interaction effects. Possible interaction
effects between different dimensions of reputations—commercial or artistic—of
producers and directors are only meaningful if adding them to the model explains
significantly more variance (Jaccard and Turrisi 2003). Before we included the
interaction terms, we mean centered the independent variables (Cohen et al. 2003).
Before we performed the regressions, we assessed whether our data suffer from
multicollinearity problems. Multicollinearity is not a problem since we found no
significant variance inflation factor (VIF) values (Mean VIF = 1.32 and largest
VIF = 1.57).
4 Results
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics and correlations for all the variables.
Table 2 shows the results of the robust hierarchical regression analysis. In the first
step, we estimated a control model including the variables budget, producer debut,
director debut, original script, prior tie between distributor and director, prior tie
between distributor and producer, and the genre dummies comedy, action, and
family. Model 1 shows that the variables, budget and comedy, have a positive and
significant effect on the size of the distributor investment in a new film (Model 1:
R2 = .53, p \ 0,001). There is also a weakly significant positive effect for prior tie
distributor and director or when a specific director and distributor have collaborated
before in the past. However, contrary to earlier studies on the film industry, prior
ties between distributors and producers, do not lead to the former investing more
resources in the latter’s new film (Sorenson and Waguespack 2006) in terms of a
larger MG.
The difference between what we find and the earlier findings by Sorenson and
Waguespack (2006) might be explained by the relatively small size of the Dutch
film industry, which makes it more likely that distributors have met and had some
contacts with most individual producers and directors, even if they have not
formally collaborated. In turn, this will decrease the effect of having prior ties
resulting from the familiarity one has with individuals one has collaborated with
before. Producers or directors who make their debut in the film industry do not
receive a significantly different investment. This is an indication that our practice of
coding new entrants with an average reputation is not likely to have affected the
analysis. Also the fact that a film has an original script as opposed to one based on a
book or theater play does not have a significant effect on the size of the distributor
investment.
In the second step, we included the commercial and artistic reputations of
producers and directors. This model allows us to test hypothesis 1. Including the
four reputation variables did not significantly increase the explained variance of the
model (Model 2: DR2 = .02, p = 0.15). Based on earlier studies, one would expect
to find a positive effect of commercial reputation on the size of the distributor
investment, since the latter can use information about past box office performance to
reduce the risk of commercial failure of the new venture. We only found a weakly
significant effect for the commercial reputation of the producer (b = .15, p \ 0.1),
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not the director. This finding partly confirms our hypothesis 1 stating that
investment will increase when the particular dimension of reputation is role
congruent
In the third step, we included interaction terms to test hypothesis 2. This
hypothesis is concerned with the effects of reputation category spanning, or the
consequences of founding members of new ventures having a fuzzy reputation, on
the amount of investment one can attract for a new venture. The added interaction
terms between the different dimensions of reputation of both producers and
directors in model 3 explain significantly more variance (Model 3: DR2 = .04,
p \ 0.001). We found partial support for hypothesis 3 that stipulates a negative
effect of category spanning of different reputation dimensions at the individual role
level and the size of the investors’ investment. With regard to the individual
coefficients, reputation category spanning by directors (b = -.14, p \ 0.05) has a
negative and significant effect on the size of the MG. Reputational category
spanning is not significant for the producer role.
Table 2 Results of Robust Hierarchical Regression Analysis of Impact of Reputations on Investment
Size (MG)
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Controls
Budget .67*** .66*** .66***
Producer debut .04 .02 .03
Director debut .03 .01 .01
Original script .02 .03 .02
Prior tie distributor and producer -.01 -.05 -.04
Prior tie distributor and director .15? .12 .13
Comedy .15* .14? .12?
Action -.07 -.08? -.09?
Family .12 .08 .09
Reputations
Commercial reputation producer .15? .16*
Commercial reputation director .03 .00
Artistic reputation producer -.07 -.06
Artistic reputation director -.03 -.06
Reputation category spanning
Commercial reputation 9 artistic reputation producer -.09
Commercial reputation 9 artistic reputation director -.14*
DR2 .02 .04**
R2 .53 .55 .59
F 9.07*** 8.30*** 14.69***
N 141 141 141
Standardized regression coefficients are reported
Two-tailed test: ? p \ .10, * p \ .05, ** p \ .01, *** p \ .001
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Figure 1 shows that although there are no individual effects of commercial and
artistic reputation of directors on the size of the distributor MG—see also model 2—
the interaction between the two dimensions is significant (b = -.14, p \ 0.05).
Directors involved in new ventures that simultaneously have a high artistic and a
high commercial reputation, receive a lower investment for their new film project.
Figure 1 visualizes that a fuzzy reputation, in other words, has a negative effect on
the ability of core members of new organizations to attract start-up capital.
We performed several robustness checks and alternative models. First, we
performed a robustness check by performing an OLS and a regular hierarchical
regression instead of a robust regression using White-Huber sandwich estimators.
The findings were consistent with our baseline model. We reported the robust
hierarchical regression model as our main model because the film industry—being a
creative industry—is characterized by a large hit-to-flop ratio and robust regression
allows one to downplay the influence of this small number of hits on the overall
results.
Second, we performed a robustness check in which we coded the reputations of
new entrants lower than the average used in the main model. Since we did not know
whether or not new entrants that search for investment capital for their first film
have a good or bad reputation in neighboring industries such as television or theater,
we performed a similar regression analysis with the only difference that we coded
new entrants as having a lower reputation. Instead of coding new entrants as having
an average reputation, we coded new entrants’ reputations between 0 and the
average reputation of those actors in the sample with a similar role who did make
earlier films. The results of the regressions after this recoding were also consistent
with our earlier findings. The effect sizes are even somewhat larger.
Third, we ran a regression in which we deleted all films with new entrants and
only producers and directors that made a film before the one for which we estimate
the size of the minimum guarantee (n = 57). We found that the commercial
reputation of the producer—although the sign remains positive—becomes insignif-
icant. The interaction effect between the commercial and artistic reputation of the
director becomes insignificant although the sign is still negative. Although we did
not find a significant interaction effect in our original model—which included new
entrants—we do find a strong, negative, and significant interaction effect between
the commercial and artistic reputation of the producer (b = .24, p \ 0.05). Taking
into account the low statistical power of this small sample regression, finding a
significant interaction effect in this small sample size provides strong support for
our hypothesis with respect to the negative effect of having more than one good
reputation.
Fourth, besides interactions between reputations within roles, we also estimated a
model that included all other interactions between roles. This allowed us to study
how particular combinations of reputations at the team level—producer and
director—could explain the amount of investment received. We, therefore, include
four additional interactions: commercial reputation director 9 commercial reputa-
tion producer, artistic reputation director 9 artistic reputation producer, artistic
reputation director 9 commercial reputation producer, and commercial reputation
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director 9 artistic reputation producer. However, none of these interactions was
significant.
We also estimated a number of alternative models not presented in this paper but
available on request. First, instead of using debut dummies for producers and
directors that are new entrants in the industry, we included alternative control
variables that measured experience in terms of number of years that producers and
directors have been active in the film industry. This slightly increased the
significance level of the commercial reputation of the producer (p \ 0.05). Second,
we added interactions between these alternative industry experience variables and
the reputation variables to check whether certain dimensions of reputations are more
important depending on career age. These interactions were not significant. Third,
we included dummy variables for both film producers and directors who attended
the most prestigious film school in the Netherlands, the Dutch Film and Television
Academy. Both variables were not significant.
5 Discussion and conclusion
In this study, we investigated the effect of reputations of founding members of a
new organization on the amount of investment capital that the new venture receives
from outside investors. Organizations that are new or in the process of being
founded encounter difficulties because they lack a performance track record or
reputation for delivering quality products (Freeman et al. 1983). While incumbents
find their abilities to obtain financial resources to be dependent on their reputation
(Milgrom and Roberts 1986; Fombrun and Shanley 1990; Stuart et al. 1999; Higgins
and Gulati 2006; Kang 2008), new organizations, especially in the start-up phase,





















Fig. 1 Interaction between director commercial and artistic reputations and investment size (minimum
guarantee)
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Earlier studies, however, show that the reputations of core members of an
organization—not necessarily new—such as top management teams, have an impact
on the reputation of the organization as a whole (Higgins and Gulati 2006; Cohen
and Dean 2005).
This study has build on these results to better understand how precisely the
individual reputations of core members of the organization affects the new
organization’s ability to attract financial resources. Besides clarifying this general
point, the core contributions of the study results from fully taking into account
multiple dimensions of reputation, multiple roles in the organization that are more
or less linked with particular dimensions of reputation, and finally, the possibility
that an individual’s reputations along different dimensions can interact.
First, we filled a gap in current research by focusing on the value of scores along
different dimensions of reputations of core members of new ventures. We
specifically studied the effect of these reputations in attracting investment capital
to new project-based organizations. A new PBO per definition has no prior history
and can be regarded as an extreme case of a new organization that has to derive its
corporate reputation from the reputations of its key members. We found partial
confirmation that the behavior of investors is affected by an individual reputation
along the dimension that best suits their own values and goals, while reputation
along the other dimension—however, much appreciated by stakeholders in
general—has no significant effect.
In our empirical setting of the film industry, we found evidence that investor
behavior in terms of providing start-up capital to new ventures is mainly affected by
the commercial reputation of its founding members. This is generally in accordance
with the findings of an earlier study that the commercial track records of the core
members of the team are a predictor of the overall budget of the film production
(Hadida 2010). Our data clearly indicate that reputational scores along the
commercial dimension significantly predicted investments by distributors, while
scores along the artistic dimension did not.
Second, by distinguishing between different roles within the organization that
can be linked to particular dimensions of reputation, we found that the way in which
reputations along particular dimensions is distributed among the occupants of these
roles has a significant effect on the decision making behaviour. Reputational assets
are not good in themselves, but they are good if they originate from individuals
performing particular roles. We found that an investor attaches the most value to the
reputation dimension that is not just aligned with the investor’s own values and
goals, but that originates from the individual occupying the role that is most closely
aligned with that dimension. This suggests that particular dimensions of reputation
are only valuable if they are role congruent. Scores along the other dimension had
no significant effect on the willingness of investors to provide start-up capital.
In our empirical case of the film industry, we found that the commercial
reputation of the individual occupying the role of producer has a strong effect on the
size of the distributor’s investment. Neither the commercial nor the artistic
reputation of the director was found to have a significant effect. A possible
explanation for this finding could be that distributors find it more difficult to
evaluate directors directly and to some extent rely on the judgment of the producer
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the commercial reputation of whom they value highly. If that would be the case, the
outside investor would not directly evaluate the whole founding team.
Third, we found that scoring highly along both dimensions (by the individual
members of the management team) may have adverse effects on the willingness of
investors to provide capital to new ventures. More sometimes is less. Adding a good
reputation along another dimension to a good reputation along the favored
dimension decreased the effect of the latter. We found that directors who at the same
time score well along both the commercial and the artistic dimension of reputation
are less attractive to investors.
This could be explained by the composite signal becoming less trustworthy
because of the assumption, among the outside observers, of the tension between
artistic and commercial talents and attitudes or of the signal becoming fuzzier and
less convincing because of the category-spanning effect (Zuckerman et al. 2003;
Hsu 2006; Hsu et al. 2009). These directors create uncertainty among investors as to
which audiences will be attracted to the new film venture. Besides uncertainty with
respect to the film’s appeal to consumers and evaluators such as film critics, it also
creates uncertainty about the reputations of the other film professionals—in the
sense of resource providers—that will be attracted to the PBO. Directors with both a
high artistic and commercial reputation may attract other PBO members that may
have either high artistic or commercial reputations or both. This, in turn, increases
the uncertainty as to which type of audience the film will appeal to when it is
completed.
It is clear that organizations, and especially new ventures, should take into
consideration not just the aims and values of all relevant audiences, but also the
individual reputations of core actors occupying particular roles in the organization
and the ways in which these individual reputations and their perceived value can
combine in the perception of a particular audience.
Our study has a number of limitations that also point the way toward further
research. First, as is often the case in research on new ventures, there is a bias
toward those firms that made it from the original idea toward realization. We did not
have data of film projects that failed to pass the first phase in the competitive
process of receiving investment capital. We focused exclusively on the relationship
between reputation and investment size for films that made it through the
investment phase. Future studies that include data about projects that were rejected
by all investors would provide a valuable extension of our understanding of investor
behavior. However, trustworthy data of that kind are hard to find in most studies
about new ventures.
Second, our database of films derives from the Dutch Film Fund (DFF). The role
and mission of the DFF is to cultivate the climate for Dutch film culture and to
stimulate film production in the Netherlands with an emphasis on diversity and
quality. This means that we only have data about films that received a certain
amount of government subsidies through the Dutch Film Fund. Based on our last
year of films in the database (2008), however, 25% of the films are made without
support from the Dutch Film Fund. This category consists of a wide diversity of
films. For example, it also includes a number of films that were made for television
and as such did not receive a minimum guarantee from distributors.
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Third, we restricted ourselves to the most important reputational signals that were
also used in previous studies, instead of taking all possible reputational signals into
account. For instance, we ignored the success of Dutch films abroad, especially in
the sense of selection for international film festivals, and being nominated for or
winning awards at these festivals.
Fourth, we focused on the effect of reputational signals and ignored other quality
signals that may be known to the providers of financial resources during the
investment decision-making process. The specific characteristics of the script and
the scriptwriter, for example, may also be possible determinant of receiving
investment capital (Eliashberg et al. 2007).
Another suggested predictor of investment decisions in the film industry is the
involvement of star actors in the project, or the credible suggestion of such star
involvement (Elberse 2007; Hadida 2010). We did not have data about the
involvement of stars at the moment when the investment decision was made.
However, besides evidence from the US that stars are no guarantee for commercial
success (DeVany and Walls 1999), stars are also less important in the European than
in the American film industry (Delmestri et al. 2005).
Finally, we only focused on two dimensions of reputation and two roles inside
the organization. This limitation is realistic for the particular environment we
studied, since, as we discussed above, film projects in the Netherlands are proposed
to investors by the producer and director of the future project. Also, in a cultural
industry such as film, the tension between art and commerce is a well-known
phenomenon, almost a cliche´. However, the general arguments proposed in this
paper seem relevant for studying the behavior of all possible audiences with respect
to all kinds of organizations the corporate reputations of which can be considered to
score along multiple dimensions that are linked to the individual reputations of
some of its members. Replication of this study in other cultural industries, as well as
in other industries, in which different dimensions of reputation can be distinguished,
could further test the generalizability of our study.
The subject of our empirical study was particularly well suited for establishing
the effects of individual performance-based reputations as constituents of corporate
reputation, precisely because in the case of film projects in the financing stage, the
project organization itself has no reputation apart from these individual reputations.
Further studies concerning organizations that do have reputation-relevant history
would allow to explore the interactions between the individual reputations and the
past performance of the organization on the decisions made by relevant audiences—
investors, but also, for instance, customers and employees—that in the end result in
future performance differentials.
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